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In March 1933, the Italian king Vittorio Emanuele III arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, to 
inaugurate the Scuole Littorie Italiane, an Italian state school designed to manifest the 
ideals of the fascist renaissance. The school invested in the future of the roughly 55,000 
Italian residents in Egypt, and the king’s visit was intended to represent the community’s 
important role in building the fascist empire.
1
 The National Fascist Party (Partito 
nazionale fascista, or PNF) in Rome assigned the journalist Mirko Ardemagni to 
accompany the king and to write a series of articles detailing the significance of the visit 
and of the Italian community in Egypt. The school, wrote Ardemagni, epitomized the 
sanctuary that the Italian state provided for its young citizens abroad, who, “far from the 
Patria ... [and] confused by the melting pot of humanity in an immense cosmopolitan city 
... meet every day under the roof of the Italian school with the same joy with which 
emigrants set their feet upon native soil after a long exile.”
2
 In this context, he continued, 
the new school relieved Italian pupils from the malaise of their cosmopolitan present and 
promised a “national” future in its place. The inauguration of the Scuole Littorie Italiane 
also signaled the culmination of the structural reorganization of the Italian community in 
Egypt around the PNF—in other words, the fascistization (fascistizzazione) of the 
community—connecting Italian émigrés to the political worlds of metropolitan Italy.  
The king’s visit was the first of a foreign sovereign since Khedive Ismail hosted a 
delegation of European royalty for the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Through the 
Italian community, the regime in Rome hoped to reinforce the “spiritual links between 
the two Mediterranean countries.”
3
 The only Italian daily newspaper in Egypt at the time, 
Il Giornale d’Oriente, published under the authority of the PNF, issued a special glossy 
magazine to celebrate the history of interactions between the two countries. The 
 3 
magazine focused on prominent figures and institutions in the Italian community. At the 
same time, the historian Angelo Sammarco—a party loyalist who would later be 
commissioned to translate anti-British propaganda into Arabic—published an article 




On the trip, Vittorio Emanuele III donated 100,000 Italian lire to Italian youth 
organizations, schools, and welfare associations in Egypt. Letters from Italian residents 
poured into the consulates expressing their appreciation for the king’s gesture, but also 
underlining the community’s acute need of financial assistance.
5
 One such letter came 
from sixteen-year-old Antoinette Paonessa. She and her brother attended Italian state 
schools in Alexandria. Their father, Giuseppe, an unemployed carpenter, had emigrated 
from Calabria between 1905 and 1912. In the letter, the young Paonessa described her 
family’s “great despair and misery.” Her father, who she described as a “faithful Italian” 
and a former combatant in the First World War, had made numerous unsuccessful 
attempts to procure gainful employment in Egypt. Her brother, she continued, was “an 
ambitious avanguardista,” a member of the fascist youth organization for fourteen- to 
seventeen-year-old boys. He was among the 3,000 Italian youth gathered to salute the 
king upon his arrival in Alexandria in what was an unprecedented rally of Italians in 
Egypt.
6
 Despite their loyalty to the “homeland” (Patria), Paonessa recounted, her family 
lacked sufficient support from the Italian state, “for work [and] for our needs [at home].” 
She concluded, “I don’t say this out of pleasure, but hoping to relieve some of this 
misery. ... I’m a young girl and I turn to His Majesty as a daughter [so that] you might 
help us.”
7
 Although her letter never reached the king, it did arrive in the office of the 
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Italian Consul, where its mélange of experience and expectation echoed the trepidation 
about the future that was increasingly expressed among Italian residents.  
The tensions to which Paonessa’s letter refers point to a number of historical 
conjunctures. Key among them are Italy’s intensifying imperial ambitions in the 
Mediterranean and Egypt’s slow decolonization. During the interwar period, and 
especially after 1933, the Italian community in Egypt became a conduit through which 
the fascist regime extended itself politically without direct territorial occupation. At the 
same time, seeking to undermine British authority in Egypt and, more broadly, in the 
Mediterranean, the regime stimulated processes of decolonization. In doing so they 
hastened the unraveling of the very conditions that had permitted Italians to reside in 
Egypt. In this article, I will show that while the fascist regime’s rhetoric embraced Italian 
“ethnographic colonies” in its expanded notion of empire, Italian residents in Egypt were 
haunted by uncertain futures.
8
 This expatriate community, as we will see, became more 
“national” in its orientation precisely when it was being threatened with imminent 
demise. 
 After the occupation of Ethiopia in 1935, at a time when around 18 percent of 
Italians in Egypt were officially unemployed, the Italian government planned to relocate 
some unemployed workers from Egypt to the newly denominated Italian East Africa 
(Africa Orientale Italiana, AOI). This scheme, they expected, would quell growing 
demand among Italian residents for collective “repatriation.”
9
 The relocation plan was 
unsuccessful, however: bureaucratic procedures stalled and opportunities for employment 
in Ethiopia proved fleeting.
10
 By 1936, 324 Italian families in Egypt relied entirely on the 
consulate for financial support, and many others leaned on locally based Italian charities, 
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such as the Società Italiana di Beneficenza (Italian Charity Organization, established in 
1850).
11
 With the strategic incorporation of Egyptian workers into the national labor force 
since 1922 (a process known as “Egyptianization” in documents from the period), Italian 
diplomats—who served as intermediaries between the Italian state and the community in 
Egypt—worried that “the conditions of our communities [in Egypt] will only continue to 
decline.”
12
 They anticipated that all Italian residents would be obliged to “repatriate,” 
interpreting declining conditions as manifestations of an irreversible historical process.
13
  
In 1937, Giuseppe Paonessa was still among the unemployed when he applied for 
relocation to Ethiopia. Two years later, his application had yet to be processed, and he 
found work as a janitor at the Scuole Littorie Italiane. With Italy’s entry into the Second 
World War in June 1940 and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of over 5,000 Italian 
civilians, Giuseppe was dismissed from his position and remained unemployed. In 1939, 
his son—the young avanguardista who had greeted the king six years prior—left to find 
work in Italy, never to return to Egypt. The remainder of the family departed Egypt 
definitively in 1953.
14
 Between 1945 and the early 1960s, over 40,000 Italians left Egypt. 
The vast majority arrived in Italy as “repatriates” (rimpatriati), their voyages paid for by 
consular offices; after 1960, they were legally categorized by the Italian state as “national 
refugees” (profughi nazionali). 
 The materials upon which this article draws reveal how the aspirations of the 
fascist regime entangled transregional processes and local realities, and thus transformed 
conditions of possibility for Italian futures in Egypt. Here and elsewhere in this article, I 
use “conditions of possibility” to draw attention to what Reinhart Koselleck calls “the 
conditions of possible events.”
15
 In other words, historical processes and structures that 
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transcend particular events. The postwar event of departure, I argue, should be seen in 
light of this interwar conjuncture of fascist imperial expansion and Egypt’s 
decolonization. Different historical actors understood the fears that compelled Italian 
residents to call for repatriation during the 1930s as processes that would, and eventually 
did, lead to en masse departure. The history of Italian departures from Egypt, however, 
has been interpreted solely in terms of post–Second World War decolonization.
16
 This 
temporal framing runs through much of the broader scholarship on decolonization in and 
beyond the Mediterranean.
17
 Likewise, Italian historiography has almost entirely 
neglected the departures of Italians from North Africa, whether they resided in Italian 
territorial colonies or elsewhere under British or French control.
18
  
 Accounts of Italian departures from Egypt that do exist depict departure as 
causally inseparable from events that demarcate the “long 1950s,” from the far-reaching 
consequences of the 1948 war in Palestine to the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser into the 
1960s. In this body of literature, the long 1950s appear as a rupture in the historical 
experience of the modern Mediterranean triggered by Arab nationalism (or by anti-
European xenophobia, depending on its polemical slant) and the crumbling of a prior 
epoch of cosmopolitan utopia.
19
 Here, departures are frequently portrayed as endings to 
one of the “brief lives” of the cosmopolitan Mediterranean, a frame some scholars have 
used to understand this period.
20
 Anouchka Lazarev, for example, characterizes the “long 
1950s” by noting that both Italy and Egypt turned their backs on the Mediterranean: Italy 
toward Europe, and Egypt toward the Arab world.
21
 These perspectives have received 
ample critique;
22
 they produce an image of the past that glosses over the complexities of 
what Will Hanley has aptly called “vulgar cosmopolitanism.”
23
 What is more, they are 
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founded on teleological renderings of the past that dichotomize history into before/after 
and therefore preclude a historiography that charts trajectories across time and place. 
Studies addressing colonial communities often preserve this temporal logic, locking 
analyses within tightly delimited historical periods. Although this follows conventions of 
twentieth-century periodization, the anticipation of Italian departures from Egypt from 




I suggest that the analytical challenge in studying connections between departure, 
repatriation, and decolonization is rooted not in our epistemological approaches, but 
rather in our hermeneutics. In other words, rather than focusing on each of these terms as 
historical categories, we should rethink the methods used to interpret their significance in 
history. Manuel Borutta and Sakis Gekas refer to the landscape of the modern 
Mediterranean as “a maritime space of colonial interactions and entanglements that 
transcended continental and national boundaries.”
25
 Much of the available scholarship 
seeks to describe colonial communities contextually within such interactions and 
entanglements—“nationalist” and “cosmopolitan” being the descriptive categories into 
which these communities are commonly situated.
26
 Yet, within these contexts, definitions 
of nation, empire, territory, and subjecthood changed and conjured new horizons.
27 
The 
fact that “repatriation” emerged as redress to the friction between experience and 
expectation for Italians in Egypt is not characteristic of categorical tensions. Its 
appearance, instead, is indicative of a prognostic disentangling of colonial Mediterranean 
networks.  
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To understand the imminence of departure of Italians from Egypt in the interwar 
period, I propose that we turn to recent efforts to examine histories of the future. 
Underlying this approach is Reinhart Koselleck’s suggestion that we should not see 
historical concepts as merely testimonial (or descriptive). He directs our attention instead 
toward the unfolding of historical time in the balance between experience and 
expectation.
28
 For Koselleck, experience and expectation “embody past and future” and 
thus enable historians to apprehend concrete, empirical processes of historical time.
29
 
Reaching beyond descriptive chronologies of history, then, the tensions and harmonies 
between experience and expectation comprise engines for the unfolding of historical 
time. Paonessa’s experience of “misery” and the promise of a national future embodied in 
the new state school, at a conjuncture when Italian futures were closing in Egypt, together 
demonstrate the significance of “repatriation” as a possible outcome. As Koselleck 
argues, the future is open and indeterminate, but it is not always surprising: “there are 
gradations of greater or lesser probability with which future reality can be predicted.”
30
 
For Italian residents, remaining in Egypt became an improbable future as the layered 
conditions that had fostered its possibility dissolved; meanwhile, national futures 
appeared to open on the horizon of the Patria.
31
  
In focusing exclusively on events that mark the “long 1950s” and ignoring this 
longer temporal frame, historians inadvertently conceal the ways subjects anticipate 
history as well as how such expectations themselves shape outcomes. The jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality preserved under the Ottoman-era capitulations, which granted 
residential and economic privileges to some foreign nationals in Egypt, conditioned 
possible outcomes of the present.
32
 The capitulations allowed Italian subjects to reside in 
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Egypt without the burden of taxation and with relative immunity from local prosecution 
until the late 1930s. More importantly, they permitted the Italian state to act upon its own 
subjects without Egyptian or British meddling. Yet, between 1919 and 1936, many 
individuals perceived interwar conflict between Italy, Britain, and Egypt as responsible 
for ending what Tabak calls the “fleeting conjuncture” during which legal and political 
regimes favored the establishment of distinct national groups within late-Ottoman 
cities.
33
 A variety of historical actors expected that the future would diverge from the 
past, even if they were uncertain what that future would yield; this anticipation entered 
the concrete processes of historical time.  
This article is organized around the past futures of Italian residents in Egypt. The 
first section considers the conditions under which the Italian community in Egypt took 
shape. The second section looks at early evidence of anticipated endings alongside 
debates regarding the importance of legal extraterritoriality. It does so from the 
perspective of Italian residents and contemporary historians writing about them. The next 
two sections argue that the fascist regime’s aggressive imperialist propaganda in the 
1930s, both in Italian institutional contexts and in Egyptian political spheres, unsettled 
regional allegiances. The final section examines the dismantling of the capitulations and 
its anticipated repercussions for Italian futures in Egypt.  
 
I. ARRIVALS  
The capitulations played a central role in fostering the conditions that made Italian 
immigration in Egypt possible. The capitulations (capitula in Latin, ahdnames in Turkish, 
and al-Imtiyāzāt in Arabic, which translates as “the privileges”) were commercial and 
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diplomatic treaties between early Ottoman rulers and European city-states that granted 
privileges to merchants in order to encourage commercial exchange. While they had 
precedents between the tenth and twelfth centuries, their modern incarnation originates 
around the fifteenth century between the Genovese city-state and Ottoman rulers. The 
treaties continually increased in number and complexity. In 1535, French subjects were 
conceded commercial and residential rights under French jurisdiction in all Ottoman 
territories. With the consolidation of European nation-states, the 1535 treaty became the 
prototype for later agreements between Western powers and the Porte. These later 
capitulations extended extraterritorial rights to many European subjects, who would fall 
under the jurisdiction of their respective consuls and were often exempted from local 
taxes.
34
 Whereas scholars have frequently concentrated on the capitulations’ role in 
generating cultural hybridity or legal pluralism within a broad social context, here I focus 
on other consequences, such as how they facilitated immigration and aided the creation of 
internally coherent expatriate communities.
35
  
Italians arrived in Egypt in various waves, some long before Italy’s national 
unification in 1861.
36
 Pisan and Genovese merchants had established a presence as early 
as the thirteenth century.
37
 Most, however, arrived much later. Beginning in the early 
nineteenth century, Mehmed Ali and his successors recruited European technicians to 
construct Egypt’s infrastructure and to assist in the centralization of state bureaucracy.
38
 
Although numbers from this period are unclear, an 1840 estimate counted “Italians” at 
around 2,000.
39
 In subsequent years, many émigrés—particularly of elite and professional 
classes—fled the political turmoil of the Italian Risorgimento for Egypt, where they were 




Following the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the political influence of the Italian 
elite and professional classes began to decline.
41
 Paradoxically, the population of Italian 
residents expanded rapidly under British rule. An influx of working-class migrants in 




Parallel to these arrivals, Egyptian nationalists sought to reduce the protections 
granted to foreign workers. Their main objective was the modification—or full 
abolition—of the capitulations. Although they succeeded in developing mixed venues of 
litigation in the late nineteenth century, a combination of national debts and pressure 
from European consuls preserved the majority of privileges enjoyed by foreigners well 
into the twentieth century. The mixed courts were used mainly to settle multinational 
commercial transactions and disputes. Attempts by nationalists to insert non-Egyptians 
into local jurisdiction had proven unsuccessful and consular courts remained the effective 
site of civil and penal litigation for Italian residents. Some Egyptian nationalists deduced 
that abolishing the capitulatory regime altogether would grant British authorities 
unmitigated power over Egypt’s economy (at the time, it was largely in the hands of non-
Egyptians, but it was distributed among them).
43
  
The capitulations constituted one of the “citizenship tools” used by liberal Italian 
governments between 1870 and 1914 to unite its national communities under the new 
state and to “penetrate” port cities in the Mediterranean through cultural and commercial 
presence.
44
 Through its consular offices, the Italian government conferred protected 
status specifically on Ottoman Jews who had settled in the region around the time of the 
Italian maritime republics and who claimed to have historical connections to metropolitan 
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Italy. By creating groups of “protected persons” (protetti) whose commercial activities 
and mobility were secured by Italian authorities, the Italian state hoped to gain access to 
merchant networks that transcended both national and imperial boundaries.
45
  
Between the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war in 1911 (which saw Italian 
residents expelled from Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, and Jerusalem
46
) and later Greek-
Turkish conflicts, many of Italy’s protetti (who were not considered fully nationalized) 
departed for safer harbors in Alexandria, where they would continue to live under the 
protection of the Italian consul. Although their precise numbers are not easily discernible, 
Egyptian censuses shows that the population of Italian Jews in Egypt grew from 4,348 in 
1897 to 6,629 in 1917; it is likely that this growth resulted in part from the arrival of 
Italian protetti.
47
 Having entered Egypt on Italian passports, they were inscribed in the 
national registries and thus considered Italian citizens. The large financial contributions 
they made to institutions linked to the Italian state well into the late 1930s is one measure 
of the relative success of  penetration through the “citizenship tool” of the capitulations.
48
 
Institutions that received vital support from Italy’s protetti included the consular courts, 
the Italian Chambers of Commerce (established in Alexandria in 1911 and in Cairo in 
1920), the Italian Hospital in Alexandria, the retirement home for Italians (est. 1928), the 
Dante Alighieri Society (est. 1896), and several locally based charity organizations. Such 
institutions became indispensable safety nets for the Italian population.
49
  
Contrary to narratives that stress social harmony under the capitulations, the 
influx of Italians was not without its problems.
50
 Almost immediately following British 
occupation in 1882, Anglo-Egyptian authorities attempted to limit immigration due to 
rising antagonism between ethnic and national groups.
51
 They especially feared the 
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consequences of the growth of an Italian “proletarian immigration” because these 
immigrants competed with Egyptian laborers and tradesmen.
52
 As early as 1899 the 
Emigration Office in Italy (a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) took measures 
to impede the pace of immigration by publicizing the “destitute conditions” encountered 
by Italian workers upon their arrival in Egypt.
53
 British authorities advised Italian police 
to enforce stricter controls on Italian ports of emigration. Yet despite such attempts to 
limit immigration, by 1907 the population of Italian residents had grown to 34,926. The 
financial crisis that same year collapsed the construction and building market in 
Alexandria and Cairo and thus left many Italians unemployed.
54
  
In accordance with British efforts, in 1908 an Italian decree limited uncontracted 
labor migration to Egypt. It stated that for blacksmiths, carpenters, and street pavers, the 
release of visas for individuals intending to travel to Egypt was “suspended for reasons of 
public order” and would be resumed only if prospective emigrants were able to exhibit 
proof of contracted work or of relatives in Egypt able to support them financially; both 
needed to be certified by an Italian office in Egypt. The decree stipulated that even if 
emigrants did indeed have employers or family members able to support them, they 
should also have adequate funds available to pay for their eventual “repatriation” 
(rimpatrio). This prospect of “repatriation” deliberately obscured the horizons of hopeful 
migrants, and it appears to set the stage for what would occur much later. 
The Emigration Office in Rome sent a copy of the 1908 decree to the Police 
Headquarters in Naples. A handwritten note accompanying the decree read: “the 
excessive crowding in Egypt of temporary Italian workers unable to find work becomes 
disruptive to public order.”
55
 “Public order” had been the rallying cry during previous 
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attempts to control emigration at the port of Naples. In 1905 and 1906, the Italian Consul 
in Port Said sent several complaints to Rome decrying the continuous arrival of 
uncontracted workers and female prostitutes, especially from the Italian South, who “only 
increase the already large numbers of unemployed Italians, damaging public order and 
bringing dishonor [disdoro] to the Italian name.”
56
 A similar statement circulated in 1913, 
during the peak year of Italian emigration, reiterating the foreign minister’s request that 
the Emigration Office not release passports to men intending to travel to Egypt without 
contracts.
57
 Describing economic activity in Alexandria and Cairo as “paralyzed,” the 
statement added that with the proliferation of unregulated prostitution, under no 
circumstances should passports be issued to women traveling alone.
58
 In a series of 
telegrams from 1915, British authorities tried to restrict working-class immigration by 
requesting that potential emigrants consult the British consulate in Naples prior to 
departure. In 1917, Italians in Egypt numbered 40,198. Still, no law explicitly regulated 
immigration to Egypt. A British decree passed in 1920 required individuals disembarking 
in Egypt to hold a British visa, but that decree was promptly dissolved with Britain’s 
unilateral declaration of Egypt’s independence in 1922.
59
 By 1927, Italian residents 
numbered 52,462. One decade later, when Italians constituted roughly 25 percent of the 
186,515 foreign residents in Egypt (a community second in size only to Greeks), 
unemployment among them was widespread. A telegram from a British administrator in 
Egypt to the prefect in Naples stated: “requests for manual workers are easily covered by 
the unemployed who are already [here]. ... Those intending to depart in search of work 
should be discouraged.”
60
 He added that there were insufficient opportunities for the 
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unemployed Italians already residing in Egypt. The promise of migration was clouded by 
an inauspicious present. 
  
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY  
The conditions set by the capitulations marked ambiguous horizons for non-Egyptian 
residents in colonial Egypt: they were both relics of a distant past and harbingers of 
change. At that intersection, fears concerning the future of Italians in Egypt appear as 
early as 1919, after violent protests against British occupation in the wake of the arrest 
and exile of Saad Zaghloul, founder of the nationalist Wafd Party.
61
 Francesco Mazza, an 
Italian born in Cairo, penned a letter to the Italian Consul in Alexandria. He wrote from 
his “hometown” (paese di origine) in Calabria,
62
 hoping to return to his wife and children 
in Egypt after serving in the Italian military in the First World War. The events of the war 
have been described as “decisive” in actualizing the “national myth” in the generation 
that witnessed national unification.
63
 Over 5,000 Italian men in Egypt responded to the 
call to arms. Although many were exempted from service—especially those employed by 
the Anglo-Egyptian government—at least 2,940 left Egypt to join Italian forces.
64
 In lieu 
of military service, many others donated large sums to the Italian state.
65
 Mazza wrote 
anxiously:  
I was just about to depart [for Egypt], but I have temporarily delayed my 
departure because I read in the papers that there was a rebellion, and that the 
whole situation is quite troubling as the indigenous nation [nazione indigena] 
revolted and caused great damage, not only in the villages but even in the cities. ... 
More disconcerting, however, is that letters from my acquaintances [in Egypt] 
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inform me that all Italians [will] need to be repatriated [tutti gl’Italiani devono 
essere rimpatriati]. ... I turn to your Excellency to learn ... if it is true that all 
[Italians will] need to be repatriated or if I can return to Alexandria without 




Italian residents deliberated over their futures in Egypt. In his letter, Mazza drew 
attention to rumors circulating among Italians of an imminent “repatriation.” He does not 
appear surprised by this. His description of the encroachment of the revolts on “the 
cities,” on the other hand, signals a shift in the perception of protected spaces for 
foreigners. Indeed, he laments the prospect that he might need to rescue his family and 
belongings (including his “mother’s heirlooms”) from Egypt. The Italian Consul 
responded two months later, informing Mazza that the revolts had subsided. Mazza’s 
doubts, however, overcame him and he never returned to Egypt. He found work in the 
recently annexed Trieste, where he foresaw a more promising future for Italians. His wife 
and children joined him there one year later.  
 Mazza and his acquaintances were not alone in finding the situation in Egypt 
unsettling. The prominent fascist intellectual Gioacchino Volpe also questioned Italian 
futures there. Following the British declaration of Egypt as an independent and sovereign 
nation in 1922, Volpe was commissioned to travel to Egypt to write a series of essays for 
Mussolini’s newspaper Il Popolo d’Italia.
67
 Having recently reinvented himself as a 
contemporary historian (he was a medievalist by training and throughout his early 
career), Volpe conflated his political commitment to the fascist party and his historical 
work. As a fervent irredentist, he claimed to have a keen sense of Italian histories in the 
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Mediterranean. He placed large and diverse “settlements” (colonie) of Italian emigrants 
in the region at the center of his writing on modern Italian history. Following nationalist 
intellectuals such as Francesco Crispi and Enrico Corradini, Volpe viewed these 
settlements as key “assets” to Italy’s “prestige” and economic expansion abroad.
68
  
 The essays on the Italians in Egypt were compiled into a small collection of 
Volpe’s writings, Fra Storia e Politica (1924), after they appeared in Il Popolo d’Italia. 
In describing the importance of Italians in the Mediterranean, Volpe drew upon a 
narrative that harkened back to the “Italian” merchants that had settled along its shores 
during the time of the maritime republics. Divergent in tone from much of his oeuvre, 
these writings represent the only speculation on the future of Italians in Egypt by an 
historian. His projections built on the tension of experience and expectation at this 
conjuncture of competing nationalist and imperialist visions of the Mediterranean. Volpe 
envisioned a waning future for Italians in Egypt at the intersection of an increasingly 
organized struggle against French and British empires in the region and an anticipated 
cancellation of the capitulations.
69
 Like Mazza, Volpe described how the rise of 
nationalist sentiment since 1919 had brought the countryside into the city and thereby 
collapsed barriers that had separated “European” and “native” spaces.
70
 These 
separations, he claimed, had aided the formation of autonomous national institutions and 
communities, ones that were destined to disappear.
71
 Within the folds of these shifting 
conceptions of territory, nation, and sovereignty, Volpe observed that Italians in Egypt 
“[felt] an obscure, looming danger.”
72
  
 Volpe fixated on the community’s imminent demise: “our postwar ... is not 
cheerful and without dark clouds, even for the Italians in Egypt.”
73
 Indeed, what Manela 
 18 
has called “the Wilsonian moment” was a time during which the logic of self-
determination (supported in various ways by Mussolini’s early regime, even while it 
violently reconquered Libya and dreamed up a plan to render the Mediterranean an 
“Italian sea”) reconfigured conceptions of possible—and just—futures.
74
 As an outcome 
of the 1919 uprisings, Volpe wrote, “one has the impression ... looking at England in 
Egypt, of a liquidating company, or, better, a company that is changing hands, firing its 
old personnel [only] to hire anew.”
75
 While it was inevitable, he claimed, that Egyptian 
nationalists would borrow “ideologies” from Europeans residing in Egyptian territory, he 
also stated that the march toward independence was part of Egypt’s irreversible national 
progress. Among the movements contributing to what Volpe saw as Britain’s gradual 
withdrawal from direct administration in Egypt, he cited the rise of Islamic movements 
(the Muslim Brotherhood would be founded several years later in 1928), struggles 
between Zionists and Arabs in Palestine (and between Zionists and local Palestinian 
Jews), and anti-European tensions on the fringe of these movements.
76
 For nationalist 
intellectuals like Volpe, the slow ending of British hegemony in Egypt signified Cairo’s 
emergence as an intellectual center that would unravel existing geopolitical networks in 
the Mediterranean and provide an ally for fascist Italy.
77
 Within this projection, however, 
there was little space for the Italian community.  
 In contrast to the potential Volpe saw in Egypt’s political evolution, he detected 
great anxiety among the Italian residents caught in this historical conjuncture. The 
“Italians of Egypt,” he wrote, sensed a “looming threat” in a part of Africa that 
strategically mapped onto Italian imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean. He described 
the Italian community in Egypt as comprised of “proletarian” emigrants who lacked the 
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“imperialist sentiment” of French, English, and German subjects elsewhere.
78
 This, he 
suggested, would be one source of their eventual downfall. Projecting into the future, 
Volpe also imagined that an independent Egypt would no longer consent to the growth of 




According to Volpe, the question of Italian futures in Egypt was inseparable from 
the conditions set by the capitulatory regime. Throughout the Mediterranean, most 
jurisdictional privileges associated with the capitulations had already been abolished: in 
Tunisia with the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1881, in Libya with Italian 
occupation in 1912, and in Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Although their 
cancellation in Tunisia did not completely dismantle the system of consular protection, it 
did create hurdles for Italian authorities attempting to administer their own 
communities.
80
 Given the “precedent of Tunisia,” Volpe anticipated that the annulment of 
the capitulations in Egypt would lead to Italy “resigning the protection of our community 
to British hands.” Additionally, he claimed, it would force all Italians to choose between 
becoming British “protégés” [protetti] or repatriation.
81
 He speculated that the breakdown 
of privileges —already underway when the British declared martial law during the First 
World War— would diminish any influence that Italy’s protetti might offer as cultural 
and commercial intermediaries. This would have a devasting impact, he noted, because 
they delivered the financial buttressing of the institutions that supported the much larger 
working-class Italian community.  
 Volpe’s concern was shared by the local Italian press. Following Britain’s 
unilateral declaration of Egypt’s independence in 1922, the local Italian newspaper, 
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L’Imparziale, circulated what it claimed were “secret instructions” behind the Anglo-
Egyptian talks. Among these “instructions” was that “the capitulations would be 
abolished and England alone would assume control over foreign interests in Egypt” 
(drawing yet again on the Tunisian experience).
82
 Indeed, British authorities noted that 
these discussions caused Italian residents to grow increasingly “apprehensive” about the 
future.
83
 Tensions rose between Italian and British subjects despite the lack of overt 
diplomatic conflict.
84
 At the time, Volpe imagined that the consolidation of the Egyptian 
monarchy would present an opportunity for Italy to negotiate a new partnership with the 
Egyptian government and thus to undermine the British from within. In a narrative that 
recounted a timeless friendship between the Italian and Egyptian peoples, Volpe claimed 
that political alliance would be possible because Italy had never constituted a “colonial 
presence” in Egypt. Yet, he positioned Egypt’s independence as a de facto triumph of 
nationalism and a sign that “everything has changed and everything is changing” in the 
Mediterranean balance of power.
85
 This promise of new alliances, however, did not settle 
the anxieties of Italian residents caught between experience and expectation: “one hears 
frequent words of lament [for times past],” Volpe commented, explaining that if 
circumstances went unchanged, then the only possibility of remaining in Egypt would 
entail the “renouncement of one’s [Italian] nationality.” In accord with Volpe’s 
observations, the Italian government saw two paths of action for this community “at 




III. BUILDING A FUTURE FOR THE ITALIANS IN EGYPT 
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In 1927, Dino Grandi, undersecretary of the Italian Ministry of Interior, announced that 
the Italian government would no longer refer to Italian “emigrants,” as previous 
governments had done, but would instead refer only to “Italians abroad.” This rhetorical 
move—largely devoid of substantive changes—intended to link Italians outside 
metropolitan Italy to the nationalist and imperialist projects of the fascist regime, thus 
extending Italy beyond its geographical borders.
87
 In Egypt, this resonated profoundly 
within the Italian community. In other emigrant destinations, the Fasci italiani all'Estero 
(associations of the PNF abroad) and their associated institutions were linked to party 
headquarters in Rome, but Italian nationals remained subject to local jurisdiction or to the 
authority of other colonial powers. In Egypt, on the contrary, extraterritoriality had 
preserved institutional autonomy by keeping the Italian community out of the reach of 
Anglo-Egyptian authority. Grandi’s move, then, had great pragmatic import in Egypt.
88
 
From Rome, the regime saw Egypt as a crucial location through which it could affirm its 
power in the region. Italian residents, schools, consular courts, and other institutions 
became the focal points of this strategy.
89
  
Major reforms were carried out to ensure that Italian schools became 
promulgators of italianità (Italianness), an older nationalist project that had become 
entangled with fascist ideology.
90
 Italian state schools had been established in 
Alexandria, Cairo, and Upper Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century, but their 
curriculum remained largely unchanged.
91
 The local Fasci—established in Egypt in 1922 
to monitor and control Italian institutions and to strengthen connections between Rome, 
the consulates, and Italian residents—had not yet linked the schools’ activities to the 
regime’s ideals.
92
 An entirely new curriculum was thus devised in 1931/32 in Cairo and 
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implemented the following year in Alexandria—one that, observed Piero Parini, the 
general director of Italians Abroad, would provide young Italians with the tools to survive 
in Egypt and would serve to reinvigorate the “prestige of Italian communities.”
93
 In this 
restructuring, fascist intellectuals and diplomats sought to renew the postunification ideas 
of Francesco Crispi, who had envisioned communities of Italian emigrants as channels 
for nation building and for the extension of Italian political influence abroad. The new 
curriculum emphasized both fascism’s “revolutionary” role in Italian political thought 
and the Italian “contribution” to Egypt’s modernization.
94
 Indeed, during his 1922 visit, 
Volpe had observed that smaller schools—like those subsidized by the Dante Alighieri 
Society (Società Dante Alighieri, SDA), a cultural institution whose goal was to 
safeguard and spread Italian language and culture abroad and to reinforce nationalist 
ideals among Italians outside the peninsula (its branch in Egypt was established in 
1896)—often embodied Crispi’s ideals better than Italian state schools.
95
 In 1931, the 
SDA had been integrated into the PNF and its cultural propaganda officially tied to that 
of the regime.
96
 In Egypt, the SDA circulated fascist publications and Istituto Luce 
propaganda films, the latter found by the institution’s administration to be the most 
“effective and diffuse” means to reach Italian residents.
97
  
As the fascist regime’s foreign policy aimed at utilizing its communities abroad to 
undermine British and French hegemony in the Mediterranean, in Egypt such actions 
were amplified by the context of extraterritoriality. Institutions such as the state schools 
and the SDA laid foundations for the promise of “national” protection. Such was the case 
for the Paonessa family, whose poverty could only be assuaged by the Patria, and the 
young Antoinette rooted her family in this imagined cross-Mediterranean kinship when 
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she addressed the king as his “daughter.” As we saw in Mazza’s letter, others had already 
looked toward the state for guidance, anticipating that their days in Egypt were 
numbered. Still others, such as the florist G. Pugliese, implored the consul to support 
Italian businesses by purchasing their services for public events, noting the widespread 
economic hardship in which they found themselves. Acknowledging his contribution as a 
combatant in the First World War, the consulate took on Pugliese as a supplier and he 
provided the floral arrangements for the king’s 1933 visit.
98
  
By late 1934, the Italian consul in Cairo observed that “a natural tendency toward 
sympathy for the fascist movement had developed” among all social strata of Italian 
residents.
99
 He attributed this consensus to the consolidation of Italian institutions under 
the “national cause” and found confirmation in the growing list of Italian elites who 
volunteered to participate in the events organized during and after the king’s visit.
100
 The 
list included prominent protetti and members of the masonic lodges who had once been 
hesitant to accept the new role of the PNF.
101
 During the Giornata della Fede (Day of 
Faith) campaign the following year, which aimed to demonstrate popular support for the 
colonial war in Ethiopia by symbolically wedding Italians to the fascist regime, Italian 
residents in Alexandria donated an average of 3.5 grams of gold per person (often in the 
form of wedding bands), a total of 500,000 piasters, and insurance policies valued at 
200,000 Italian lire. This was nearly double the average amount given by Italians in Italy. 
Members of the unemployed working class, the wealthy elite, and a large number of 
Italian Jews were among the donors. While this was an immensely meaningful gesture for 
a population experiencing a steady rise in unemployment, perhaps it also indicates that 
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James Sheehan has argued that territorial claims facilitated the strengthening of 
national identities.
103
 This Mediterranean example provides a twist to his assertion: the 
Italian state was able to extend itself over its subjects abroad through a regime of 
extraterritoriality that contemporaneously tied them to nationalist and imperialist projects. 
Among many Italians in Egypt, this coupling of nation and empire fortified a sense that 
Italy was both a source of protection and a promise for the future. Parini, who had 
attended the king’s inauguration of the Scuole Littorie Italiane in 1933, closed his speech 
during the visit by declaring: “young Italians on Egyptian soil, the future belongs to you. 
… Preserve the sacred pride of being children of a great Patria and remember that every 
conquest of space and spirit is the fruit of sacrifice.”
104
 The capitulations permitted Italy’s 
expansive nationalist project at the same moment that Egyptian nationalists sought to 
redefine Egypt’s national sovereignty, setting up an untenable tension between Italian 
experiences in colonial Egypt and their expectations in the shadow of the Patria.  
 
IV. FASCIST IMPERIAL FUTURES AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE PRESENT 
Notwithstanding the violent repression of the Senussi rebellion in Libya in 1930–31, the 
Italian government portrayed itself as a “peaceful” power that championed nationalist 
movements during much of the first decade of fascist rule in Rome (1922–32).
105
 
Historians generally concur that this was a continuation of liberal Italy’s foreign policy, 
which had promoted Italian cultural and commercial “penetration” in the Mediterranean 
as a means of gaining imperial power relative to the British and the French.
106
 In parallel 
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with the restructuring of Italian institutions and the king’s 1933 visit, however, the 
government in Rome began an aggressive propaganda campaign that emphasized Italy’s 
drive for territorial expansion, reviving the myth of the Roman Mare Nostrum. In 1934, 
when Mussolini declared Africa and Asia to be within the “historic objectives” of Italy’s 
“natural expansion,” fascist propaganda took on threatening undertones in Egyptian and 
British political contexts. As a result, Italian residents became more susceptible to 
reactions from their “hosts” and from colonial authorities.
107
  
Italian efforts to mitigate opposition to its imperialist policies exploited Egypt’s 
diverse public sphere. The Italian Ministry of Press and Propaganda, formed with 
Galeazzo Ciano as its director in 1935 (and renamed the Ministry of Popular Culture in 
1937), began a campaign of “Arab propaganda.” Fascist authorities sought to convince 
Egyptian nationalists that Italy posed no territorial threat to Egypt.
108
 The ministry 
attempted to control information circulating on Italian colonies: journalists in Egypt 
writing in Italian, Arabic, French, Greek, and English were bribed and advised on 
appropriate content regarding Italian history and politics.
109
 Radio Bari, the first 
internationally broadcast Arabic-language radio station, was one of Italy’s most powerful 
weapons in this endeavor. In its cultural programming, Italy was presented as a “friendly 
nation” to its Arabic-speaking audience. Reports on opposition in Libya and East Africa 
were explicitly omitted.
110
 Around 60 percent of the broadcasts were considered “cultural 
programs” that explored historical encounters between Italians and Muslims.
111
 This 
formed part of a broader project to mythologize the “timeless” links between Italy and the 
Arab or Islamic world. Although Radio Bari failed to instill sympathy for the Italian 
regime, it was measurably successful in its capacity to incite Egyptian and Arab 
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nationalists against British and French hegemony in the Mediterranean.
112
 This would 
become a recipe for later problems. 
In the mid-1930s the Italian government began to support several Egyptian 
nationalist movements, notably the leaders of Young Egypt (Misr al Fatat) and their 
militant youth group, the Green Shirts, as well as the official Wafd militia, the Blue 
Shirts.
113
 Mussolini’s office in Rome furnished literature on fascist political and social 
projects to these militant groups and closely monitored their activities. Both organizations 
united youth through “squadrons” and sporting activities and adopted a salute similar to 
the Roman salute used by Italian fascists. Italian diplomats in Egypt imagined that 
bolstering these movements—which provided significant opposition to British authorities 
and to moderate figures in the Wafd—would help Italy appear sympathetic to the 
aspirations of young Egyptians.
114
 In this regard, Italian efforts were by no means covert. 
After a series of anti-Italian critiques appeared in one of the popular English-language 
newspapers published in Cairo, the leader of Young Egypt openly declared his support 
for the “Italian government and its people,” including in his message a note of 
appreciation for the Italian community in Egypt.
115
 His statement was personally received 
and acknowledged by Mussolini.
116
  
During broad anti-British demonstrations between 1934 and 1935, Makram 
Ebeid, the Wafd’s second in command and a member of its leadership since the party’s 
inception, publicly condemned the PNF for their moral and material support of local 
militant groups. The English-language press, read widely among Egypt’s elite classes and 
non-Egyptian populations, warned that Italian support for these paramilitary movements 
obstructed a prompt resolution to the “question of the Capitulations” and, in doing so, 
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served only to exacerbate the disquiet among foreign communities in Egypt.
117
 The 
primary goal that united militant groups was the eventual abolition of capitulatory 
privileges for foreign residents and businesses. The issue was of exceptional concern to 
European residents because it threatened the legal structures that legitimized their 
presence in Egypt. In drawing attention, then, to Italian support of the militant groups, 
British authorities hoped to build a united movement among foreign communities against 
the Italian position.  
The Wafd feared that Egypt could become a theater of war for Anglo-Italian 
conflict. Italy’s 1935–36 invasion of Ethiopia had revealed a violently imperialistic 
regime,
118
 compelling many Egyptian intellectuals who had previously shown even the 
slightest sympathy toward the Italian regime to back away from their positions. Italy’s 
invasion of Ethiopia also stirred some nationalists due to religious affinities between 
Egyptians and Ethiopians.
119
 Many were angered by Italy’s unilateral declaration of the 
autonomy of the Ethiopian Coptic Church, splitting the church that had united Egyptian 
and Ethiopian Christians. Other Egyptian nationalists anticipated that Italian control of 
the headwaters of the Nile would have disastrous effects on Egypt’s agriculture.
120
 The 
Suez Canal occupied a central place in British anxieties. Italian ships amounted to nearly 
50 percent of the traffic passing through its waters in 1935 and, as Italian forces grew in 
Libya and Ethiopia, the potential of an attack from the Western Desert to protect Italy’s 
passage through the canal became a possibility. The director of the Banco Italo-Egiziano, 
the Italian bank responsible for the accounts of elite Italians and Italian institutions in 
Egypt, observed that the events in Ethiopia brought hostility specifically from Greek and 
Coptic communities due to their shared Orthodox Christianity but also evoked more 
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general concerns that Italy’s actions would disrupt Egypt’s status quo. He cautioned that 
these apprehensions would compromise both wealthy and poor Italian residents.
121
 The 
director of the bank described “tendentious voices” agitating Egyptians and European 
residents in Alexandria and Cairo: “one [hears] talk of an Italian threat from Tripolitania 
and of bombardment [on Egyptian cities]. ... It could [only] end with a reaction against 
Italian residents, who would remain without any protection.”
122
 Italy’s menace as an 
imperial power had outpaced its “Arab propaganda,” and the projected consequences 
rattled the foundations of the Italian community. As the fascist regime mapped Egypt’s 
Italians into their policies as “historical” and “cultural” justification for their special 
relationship with militant Egyptian nationalists, its imperialist aspirations directly 




V. DISMANTLING THE PAST, DISMANTLING THE FUTURE 
In 1935, Mussolini sent Pellegrino Ghigi as the minister of Italy in Egypt to craft a plan 
to improve the conditions of the Italian community.
124
 In the meantime, however, the 
Egyptian government had reinitiated talks for a Treaty of Alliance with the British, which 
amplified problems for the Italian leadership. Signed in summer 1936, the treaty 
acknowledged Britain’s interest in the Suez Canal, permitted British troops to remain in 
the country without constituting a military occupation, and conceded greater authority to 
the British administration in the case of war. Importantly, it also set a date for formal 
negotiations to end the capitulations. The treaty represented an alliance between British 
authorities, the Wafd, and the Egyptian monarchy after several years of violent unrest.
125
 
Whereas rumors had spread that Italian diplomats were on the verge of reaching a 
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nonaggression pact with Egypt, British concessions, arguably made out of fear that Egypt 
would indeed fall into alliance with Italy, helped to draw the “wind out of the Italian 
sails.”
126
 Tensions had grown so palpable around the time of the invasion of Ethiopia that 
the British devised a plan to arrest and intern around 12,500 Italian civilians in order to 
quell the “threat” of what they saw as a “fifth column community.”
127
 Some historians 
have argued that it was precisely the conflict of Anglo-Italo-Egyptian interests that drove 
Mustafa al-Nahhas, Egypt’s prime minister, to come to terms with the British.
128
 
According to a contemporary British commentator, the alliance was “brought about 
through the agency of a third party—Italy.”
129
 With this treaty, the fascist regime suffered 
a major blow to its regional interests. 
In Egyptian historiography, the 1936 treaty is remembered as demarcating a new 
phase in the country’s political history.
130
 The desire to deal finally with the capitulations 
was central. Tax exemptions and legal privileges enjoyed by foreigners had made it 
exceedingly difficult for an ascendant population of educated Egyptians (the efendiyya) 
to participate in the country’s economy.
131
 Privileges enjoyed by foreigners were 
perceived to encumber Egyptians directly. In one report, the Italian Minister Ghigi 
acknowledged, “the aspiration of Egypt to free itself from the consular privileges and to 
[integrate] the foreigners [gli stranieri] residing in [its] territory into the sphere of 
common law ... [has been] long anticipated.” He claimed that since 1922, Egypt’s 
political parties agreed most resoundingly on one matter alone: that an end to the 
capitulatory regime was paramount to “the struggle for complete independence.”
132
  
Prior to the signing of the 1936 treaty, Ghigi nevertheless made a last-ditch effort 
to defend the capitulations. With the anticipated consequences for the Italian community 
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in mind, he wrote to the Egyptian government that “reform” was fundamental to the 
“development” of the public and private lives of the Egyptian populace. Yet, he argued, 
the capitulatory regime involved “real agreements” that should be settled one-by-one 
between the Egyptian government and the individual powers with which they were 
signed. They were not “abstract privileges,” as Ghigi asserted they were being framed in 
Egyptian political discourse.
133
 He wrote, “[the capitulations] are anything but an internal 




The minister had the full support of Ernesto Cucinotta, the Italian consular judge 
and a crucial intermediary between Italian residents and diplomatic actors. Cucinotta had 
a first-hand sense of the extent to which jurisdictional extraterritoriality was integral to 
safeguarding national interests and institutions. The consular courts, he argued, gave 
Italian residents autonomy among the mix of national communities in Egypt. He claimed 
that without the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the consular courts, Italian subjects would 
not be considered equal to other Europeans, their institutions would collapse, and the 
community would lose the “prestige” that had been carefully propped up in the early 
1930s. 
Cucinotta anticipated that dissolving extraterritorial jurisdiction would turn the 
community inside out. The proportionately large Italian population and the vast amount 
of work that would be transferred away from the consular courts was the only argument 
he believed would persuade the Egyptian government to allow for substantive Italian 
participation in future negotiations. At the time, Italians numbered 52,462 (18,548 in 
Alexandria, 17,500 in Cairo, and the remainder spread between the cities in the Canal 
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Zone and in Upper Egypt). Cucinotta noted that in the Italian consular courts, around 
1,100 penal and 200 civil proceedings had been processed each year since 1930. He 
suggested that the drastic increase in the volume of work that would be required of a 
transitional court could aid in lobbying for a larger Italian presence in a future legal 
system—or, he proposed, it could be used to persuade Egyptian authorities to allow 
modest protections for the Italian community. These details alone, he claimed, could 
preserve the national sovereignty of Italian residents and institutions.
135
  
Questions regarding the future of the Italian community became more urgent. In 
1935, only a few years after having been linked to the PNF, the leadership of the SDA 
expressed angst regarding the “likely” closure of foreign schools in Egypt.
136
 The signing 
of the 1936 treaty aggravated such anxieties. Several months later, the Italian consul in 
Alexandria wrote that Italian institutions were ultimately in a state of “continual decline.” 
Fearing the end of the community’s support networks, many residents had “repatriated” 
at their own expense and an additional 183 individuals (and their families) had done so at 
the expense of the consulate in Alexandria—a trend he expected to accelerate due to the 
upsurge in requests for “consular repatriation.”
137
 An inauspicious future pushed Italians 
out of Egypt. Mario Vanni, for example, an engineer who had moved to Cairo in the early 
1920s, sent his wife and daughter to Florence in 1935 and then, one year later, returned to 
Italy himself, “selling off” (svendere) his belongings, he wrote, “[because] the tense 
relations [between Italy and Britain] portend the outbreak of war.”
138
  
The Italian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Cairo—an institution that represented 
artisans and small businesses as well as major industrial interests—told a similar story. Its 
members expected that the adversities confronting Italian residents would be intensified 
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by the cancellation of the capitulations. The ICC presented a “large-scale repatriation” as 
the only viable solution to the anticipated scarcity of employment opportunities and 
infrastructural support.
139
 The institution’s leadership advised that in future negotiations, 
Italy should demand clear assurances from the Egyptian government that Italian residents 
would be free to depart and return as they wish. Without this guarantee, which it noted 
was quite unlikely, the divide between metropolitan Italy and Italians in Egypt caused by 
the latter’s ever-increasing privation would become dangerously acute. Indeed, by 1937, 
the financial support provided to Italian institutions by elite members of the community 
had diminished alongside a steady drop of investments in Italy made by Italian residents 
in Egypt.
140
 Italians lost ground in every category of professional life and their incomes 
rarely matched the rising cost of living. 
The ICC in Alexandria noted that the vast majority of Italians lived hand to 
mouth.
141
 Throughout the late 1930s, Salvatore Caccioppo, an Italian resident in Attarin, 
Alexandria—a neighborhood in which Italians numbered roughly 10 percent of the non-
Egyptian population—had requested pecuniary aid from the consulate for his children’s 
expenses at the Italian state school. In considering Caccioppo’s circumstances, the consul 
noted that “because of the employment crisis [facing Italians], Mr. Caccioppo is 
absolutely unable to pay and occasionally his family even lacks bread at home.”
142
 His 
circumstances, the consul continued, were typical of those facing the residents who 
would suffer the immediate consequences of an end to the capitulations.  
The Società Italiana di Beneficenza, which had been the lifeblood of the 
community, also witnessed decreasing contributions from in-country donors.
143
 Italian 
residents needed every piaster to maintain their livelihoods; a majority had come to rely 
 33 
on the heavily subsidized resources of state institutions.
144
 Furthermore, many Italians 
suspected that integration into local jurisdiction would entail new taxes and residency 
fees, thus augmenting the overall cost of living.
145
 A note from the ICC in Cairo read:  
the Italian worker [l’operaio italiano], who for his survival requires moral support 
(schools, cultural and recreational associations) and material assistance (free 
education, books, refreshments, hospital services, subsidies, etc.), will not be 
assisted by his community ... just at the moment in which he will most 
significantly be affected by the need for assistance. … Without means to resist, 




The ICC in Alexandria echoed these concerns:  
Without a doubt, one cannot ignore the rights of the natives [indigeni] ... to be 
protected and even favored, and therefore any attempt to resist this natural, 
legitimate postulate [the abolition of the capitulations] might seem useless. ... If it 
is inevitable that our communities resign [themselves] to a gradual retreat ... they 
would find themselves required to abandon—in a short time—the territory in 




As these reports reached Rome, the fascist regime inflated the “historic” role 
Italians played in Egypt’s modernization, inadvertently highlighting the contrast between 
experience and expectation. During the late 1930s, Italian intellectuals in Egypt, 
including the historian Angelo Sammarco and others sent from Rome, orchestrated a 
series of conferences and publications around this topic.
148
 For these intellectuals, the 
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community’s significance could only be measured through retrospection. Members of the 
Italian community, however, interpreted unfolding events as irreversible processes: work 
progressively vanished for the generalized “Italian worker,” composed of a mosaic of 
families similar to those of Caccioppo, Mazza, and Paonessa mentioned in this article. In 
addition, the weakening capacity of the consulates to provide secure shelter for Italian 
protetti led to the unraveling of “a patient work of education and gradual absorption [into 
Italian society]” among many of the largest donors to Italian institutions, just as Volpe 
had imagined fifteen years prior.
149
 The anticipation of possible outcomes began to shape 
the present. Anxieties fueled the unfolding of historical time that, in turn, displaced 
Italian futures from Egypt. Several weeks before the conference organized to negotiate 
the cancellation of the capitulations, one report concluded that it would become 
impossible for Italians to remain in Egypt without legal protections “at the very moment” 





In April 1937, the conference for the abolition of the capitulations convened in Montreux, 
Switzerland. During preliminary statements, Egyptian delegates stressed their desire for 
“complete liberation” from the capitular regime, drawing upon the example of the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne. Pellegrino Ghigi, who headed the Italian delegation, noted that the 
1923 treaty had brought an end to all Italian institutions in Turkey. He imagined that the 
conclusions of Montreux would similarly strike a final blow to the much larger 
community of Italians in Egypt.
151
 The Italian delegation aimed to protect the “current 
and future” interests of Italians in Egypt; they stressed the importance of state institutions 
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in “maintaining italianità.” Despite tense discussions between Ghigi and Makram Ebeid, 
who led the Egyptian delegation, Ghigi was promised that the Egyptian government had 
the “absolute intention” to secure Italian institutions.
152
 Such assurances, however, were 
binding only for the duration of the period of transition away from the capitulations.
153
  
These uncertain futures, Ghigi supposed, would produce detrimental 
“psychological effects” among Italians. Indeed, during the negotiations in Montreux, 
Italian residents bombarded their consulates with notes of trepidation. The pages of Il 
Giornale d’Oriente conveyed their apprehension.
154
 Intending to quell unrest by 
navigating the tension between experience and expectation, the newspaper’s editors 
stated:  
[Italians] must not think that all will continue as before. Important things will 
change; but any pessimism is futile and illegitimate. To live and work in Egypt 
for foreigners will no longer be easy. ... One epoch finishes and another begins. ... 
It is a gross error to believe in the fixity and immovability of certain 
[demographic and national] situations. The world goes on and woe unto those 




Events in the following year intensified the disquiet. While the Italian population was 
never homogenous, it had transformed from a scattered population of residents into a 
tightly knit community that demonstrated a strong sense of italianità.
156
 This rang true 
across all social strata. During the 1930s, antifascist organizations in Egypt had been 
almost nonexistent; the few that emerged did so on the eve of the Second World War and 
received little attention from within the Italian community.
157
 British authorities struggled 
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to find Italians opposed to the regime,
158
 and until 1940 they worried that the fascist 
regime would use its connections among Italian Jews to subvert any restrictive measures 
the British authorities might apply against Italians.
159
  
 The application of the Italian Racial Decree Laws in 1938, however, threatened to 
challenge this consensus. Until 1938, few Italian Jews in Egypt had outwardly exhibited 
sentiments contrary to fascism. Indeed, rather than evoking animosity toward the regime 
itself, the anti-Jewish legislation provoked a great deal of confusion within the 
community. Many Italian Jews felt themselves to be as patriotic as other Italians; this was 
especially the case among those who contributed on a regular basis to local Italian 
charities and institutions. After the fascistization of Italian schools in Egypt, some had 
gone so far as to pull their children from French schools and place them in Italian ones.
160
 
When asked to complete “declaration of race” (dichiarazione di razza) forms, documents 
required after the implementation of the racial decrees, many Italian Jews contended that 
religious identity had been secondary to their “Italian sentiment” and that it had never 
compromised their loyalty to the regime.
161
 In some cases, these forms included 
interventions from the consul or leading members of the Fasci asserting that the 
individual in question had demonstrated exemplary signs of italianità through their 
regular participation in or donation to Italian institutions. Such was the case of Alberto 
Belleli, the lawyer who had negotiated the contract with the Egyptian government for the 
purchase of the lands used to build the Scuole Littorie Italiane. After several objections 
were sent to Rome, both the consul and the Fascio refused to dismiss Belleli from his role 




 In this conjuncture, requests for repatriation steadily increased. Nicola Santoro, in 
1939, wrote to the consul declaring: “I can’t afford to live amidst so many enemies.”
163
 
Another Italian worker who had been discharged from the Suez Canal Company wrote:  
you know, undoubtedly, that life in Egypt has become very difficult for our 
compatriots [connazionali]. ... When searching for employment, one hears 
nothing but ‘you are Italian, sir, we regret that we can’t employ you (vous etes 




While fascist policy and propaganda had drawn the Italian community closer together 
under its nationalist banner, it had concurrently pulled the rug out from under the 
community.
165
 The leadership of the Dante Alighieri Society struggled to obtain 
payments from its associates, and rumors spread widely among the society’s most loyal 
members that it was bound to disappear. Attempting to breathe life into the welfare 
coffers in 1939, the consul in Alexandria appealed to past donors. He implored, “it is 
futile to illustrate for you, who know all too well the needs of our community, [and] the 
need to help—today more than ever—the innumerable families fallen into poverty who 
search for work in vain and for whom ... repatriation is not possible.”
166
  
The Italian community never recovered. Following Italy’s entry into the war in 
June 1940, British authorities proceeded with the arrest and internment of more than 
5,000 Italian males between 18 and 60 years of age. They suspected that Italians would 
incite militant Egyptian political movements.
167
 Anglo-Egyptian authorities imposed the 
military clauses of the 1936 treaty, and diplomatic relations between Italy and Egypt were 
severed. British authorities put a conservative sequester on all Italian accounts, which 
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went unresolved until 1947.
168
 Poverty and prostitution became widespread in a 
community that lacked employment opportunities and political representation.
169
 The 
Scuole Littorie Italiane was converted into a hospital for Egyptian troops after Italian air 
raids destroyed part of the city (and in 1949 the school was ceded to the Egyptian 
government following negotiations to reestablish ties between the two countries). After 
the release of imprisoned Italians in 1945, the postwar Italian government avoided 
discussion of a collective repatriation at all costs, despite insistence on its necessity from 
within the community. The new republican government concluded that the political 
sympathies of the Italians from Egypt would impede Italy’s democratic transition.
170
 The 
Italian community went from being portrayed as essential to Italy’s future in the 
Mediterranean to being perceived as a community encumbered by its past. When Vittorio 
Emanuele III abdicated in 1946, he left Italy for Egypt, where he was received by a 
community of Italians that remained overwhelmingly loyal to him.
171
 
This article has argued that developments during the interwar period set into 
motion key processes that disentangled the colonial Mediterranean. These insights are 
clarified through a hermeneutic that focuses on the tension between experience and 
expectation as engines of historical time. As this article has shown, the extraterritorial 
conditions set in place by the Ottoman-era capitulations in conjunction with Italian 
emigration, the rise of fascism, and competing Mediterranean imperialisms made possible 
the formation of an Italian community in colonial Egypt that increasingly looked toward 
the Italian state to safeguard its futures. Yet, antagonisms between imperialist and 
nationalist projects that extended beyond territorial colonial relations caused great 
uncertainty regarding the jurisdictional boundaries that had engendered this very 
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community. These antagonisms culminated in the abolishment of the capitulations, the 
legal regime that had been foundational to Italian experience in Egypt. In showing this, 
we have seen how the expectation of “repatriation” during the interwar period locates 
physical departures from Egypt in a longer historical duration. Within this Mediterranean 
constellation of nation, empire, and territory, anticipated futures of departure thus 
challenge the teleological frameworks that center narratives of decolonization around the 
events of the “long 1950s.”  
This tension between experience and expectation had concrete consequences. 
Although Italians were provided the opportunity to opt for Egyptian nationality in 1948, 
which would have assured them of residency status, few chose to do so.
172
 In order for 
most Italians in Egypt to remain “Italian” in the way they had come to understand their 
national affinities within Italy’s imperial enclave in extraterritorial Egypt, departure 
became necessary. Indeed, two decades after his speculations on Italian futures in Egypt, 
the historian Volpe would write of the Italian community in Egypt only in the past 
tense.
173
 After the Second World War, the population that had numbered over 55,000 
sharply declined. Many emigrated to South America and Australia; most went to Italy. 
By the early 1950s, “repatriation” had become a social fact in the lives of Italian 
residents. Reports from 1950 and 1951 estimated that as many as 6,000 Italian families 
had left Egypt since the end of the war in search of “the security of a more prosperous 
future.”
174
 The circumstances of mass departure forced the Italian government to address 
at last the long-standing question of repatriation. By 1960, the legal definition of 
“national refugee” was expanded to include Italians arriving in Italy from Egypt who 
lacked connections and resources in the metropole, but who nevertheless saw themselves 
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as emblems of Italy’s history in the Mediterranean.
175
 As history unfolded, Italian futures 
in Egypt became futures past.   
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